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tions between the states and the United States and vice versa.
With respect to any one of these important points we venture
W. W.
to suggest that no better book can be found.

THE

LAW OF TOWNSHIPS AND THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF
TOWNSHIP OFFICERS IN PENNSYLVANIA.
By WILLIAM
TRICKETT, Dean of the Dickinson School of Law. Pp. xvi+
565. Philadelphia: T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 19o5.

In this volume, which, to use the words of "the author, "attempts for the first time, possibly, to collate the law with respect
to townships in Pennsylvania," Mr. Trickett, following the general plan of his work on the law of boroughs in Pennsylvania,
has given to the Pennsylvania lawyers in whose practice questions relating to the subject of the volume arise a compilation
of statutes and cases which should prove of great value to such
practitioners and of which he must often have felt the need.
The book treats of the formation and division of townships, election districts, and school districts; the classification
of townships under the Acts of April 28, 1899, and May ii,
i9O1; the powers of a township; the questions of franchises,
expenditures, and taxation in relation to the same; action by
and against townships; the liability of townships upon contracts and torts, and the various rights and duties of township
officers, the duty of supervisors in relation to roads and bridges
being very fully considered.
A chapter of forms, the text of the Act of April 15, 1903,

creating the State Highway Department, and a list of the
special acts relating to townships in the several counties enacted
before the adoption of the Constitution of 1874 have been
added.
E.P.S.
NOTES ON RECENT LEADING ARTICLES IN LEGAL PERIODICALS.
REv
IEw.-April.
The Hague Court and Vital Interests. Sir Thomas Barclay. The
object of the article is to examine the position of the Hague Court in
connection with the scope of arbitration. We have first a slight sketch of
the institution of the HIague Court; its " remaining like a marble monument, grand but u-eless." for three years, and then-all honor to the
new world-the United States of America-and Mexico gave it its first
case. This example has been followed by Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Venezuela. and Japan. Yet " questions of national honor
or vital interests" are still without the scope of compulsory arbitration,
which is felt to greatly curtail the benefits to be hoped for from the
Hague Court.. In mentioning the action of the Senate of the United
States in inserting the word " treaty" for that of " agreement" in the
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recent case of the arbitration treaties, the author was probably not aware
that the Senate was making no new claim of power, but was simply keeping to the safe and, for it, the only possible road in the matter, and that,
therefore, it will not be possible for them to reconsider their action, but
that it will be a very easy matter to secure the consideration of arbitration treaties properly presented.
Contingent Future Interests After a ParticularEstate of Freehold.
Albert Martin Kales. The writer endeavors to ascertain what ground
the cases give for the assertion that, without the aid of statutes, contingent remainders are no longer destructible.
First th, interests are classified, then named, then the extent to which
they are recognized as legal estates noted. In conclusion the author says:
" It is submitted, then, that in any American jurisdiction, even though
its land laws may be founded upon those of England, and though there
may be no contingent remainder act in force, yet if neither actual
decision nor the practice of conveyancers has settled the law to the contrary, it may fairly be contended that there is practically no such future
interest as a contingent remainder; that is, there is no rule of law which
says that a future springing interest, after a particular estate of freehold
which may be turned into a vested remainder, or take effect in possession
eo instante upon the termination of the particular estate, must fail
entirely unless it does so."
Notes on Maine's Ancient Law. Sir Frederick Pollock. We are here
given some rather fragmentary but interesting notes on the Antiquity of
the Roman Law; Customary Law in Homer; .Early Forms of Law;
Written and Unwritten Law; Early Codes; English Case Law and Fiction; and the Law of Nature and Jus Gentium and Equity.
MICHIGAN LAw Rxvmw.-April.

The Power of the Senate to Amend a Treaty. B. M. Thompson. The
value of a discussion upon such a point depends entirely upon the width
of view and absence of partisanship displayed by those who discuss it.
Unfortunately, both are absent from this article. No one can read such
articles, written apparently with a feeling of what the author, to use
his own spelling of the word, wc 14iprobably call "peek," without recalling Washington's warning against the dangers into which party
spirit would inevitably lead us.
The Liability of Water Companies for Fire Losses. Edson R. Sunderland. Premising that municipalities are not liable for such losses,
the question is asked, "Does the same immunity attach to a private corporation under contract with the municipality to provide water for
general fire purposes?" Between the property owner and the company
on a direct contract the liability is established, but lack of privity has
been held to be a defence where the individual sues on a contract
between the city and a corporation. Privity, however, is not always
essential for such suits. Some of the courts hold that the contracts of
the municipality are made " for the public as composed of individual
persons," and that, therefore, the city is but the agent of the public.
;r. Sunderland approves of this " very sensible and reasonable view."
The courts being driven to take this view by force of legislative action,
or clauses in the contract, took refuge in the second of the requisites,
viz., absence of duty or obligation owing from the city to the property
owners. Such a duty being requisite, the cases are conceded fo be rightly
decided which refuse a recovery, though the question of a duty to the
property owners by the city might be raised. If such a duty is not a
requisite, and this is thought to be the better rule, the cases seem to
be wrongly decided. In the able discussion of these cases we are led
to see, before the fact is called to our attention by the author, that the
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question is one phase of the larger question respecting the right of a
third person to sue upon a contract. It affords some very interesting
material for the further illumination of that obscure region of the law.
Curb-Stone Patent Opinions. Dwight B. Chever. A number of important questions are asked and given what the author calls "off-hand"
replies. These replies, however, are very clear, direct, and to the point,
and seem to make a very good primer for the ordinary patentee, who
would probably be irremediably confused if sent to the decisions for the
law upon the subject
YALE LAw Joumms.-April.
FederalControl of Corporations. Thomas Thacher.. At the outset we
are told that "this object not being within the lawful field of Federal
action, legislation to this end would be unjustifiable; but yet the courts
could hardly declare it void." Then we are asked the pertinent question,
"Are we ready to increase the powers of the Federal Government and
diminish the powers of the states? To state the question is to answer
it." It is to be hoped so unless "we are willing to bid farewell to the

fundamental theory of the Federal Constitution and to call the wisdom
of the fathers folly." But is not this being already done every day? The
folly of the fathers, the wisdom of the newest comer, is preached to
us upon every side. Mr. Thacher regards the proposition as "a tremendous change towards centralization and a long step towards Federal
soclism."
Judicial Legislation in New York. Wilbur Larremore. The interest
of this paper is not confined to those who practise in the courts of New
York. "Judge-made law" has been heard of in other forums. But in
spite of Mr. Larremore's examples of the viciousness of this tendency it
does not seem wholly an evil that "our vast accumulation of case law
tends to dwindle in authority and assurie the virtual status of opinions
of the jurisconsults under the system of the civil law." Indeed, to some
this may seem the very best result that could be attained.

AmERICAN LAw REVImw.-May-June.

The Code of Hammurabi and American Law. Owen B. Jenkins.
The discovery of a code of laws dating back to 228 5-2242 B. C. has
naturally excited much attention, not only from the legal world, but
from all classes of persons. Mr. Maxcy's account of this interesting
document is vivid, and he seems to have caught the spirit of -the old
code more completely than anyone who has as yet described it. He
says: "It is purely a state document, like our own statute books,
attending strictly to the duties of the state as a conservator of the
public order and dispenser of justice between citizens, yet containing
evident recognition of the church in, inter alia, its references to
' votaries' who were religieuses. Crime is not portrayed as a sin
against the gods to be cleansed from the sinner by a sacrifice to an
outraged divinity. It is punished a2s an offence against public order
entitling the community in self-prbtection to chastise the criminal
There is an astonishing absence from the code of all theological or
even ceremonial law."
Hammurabi is shown to have bad a more just, conception of the
" varying force with which it" (the law) "meets the poor and the
rich." He expressly decrees that offenders shall pay for the same
offence different fines, levied on a sliding scale according to the depth
of the offender's pocket-book." Legal charges, too, were scaled down
to the limits of the poor man's purse; but the reason for this greater
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apparent justice we find in the attitude of the law towards the men it

affected. There was no theory of equality under the law, therefore it
was not necessary to treat men as if they were equal. The apparent
fault in our law comes from the attitude we have taken that the law
is made for the simple citizen who may be either rich or poor, for the
one is the equal of the other; it is the man who matters, not what
he has. Mr. Jenkins ends with a glowing tribute to the wisdom of
Hammurabi as exemplified in his code.
The Influence of the Bar in the Selection of Judges throughout the
United States. Simon Fleischman. The author prepared for the writing of this article by formulating six questions which he propounded
to six lawyers in each state and territory in the Union-three Democrats and three Republicans. A synopsis of the answers given is
printed at the end of the article, the paper itself giving the conclusions
drawn from these replies. Suggestions are also made that the bar
should exercise as much influence as possible in the selection of judges;
the requirements for admission should be raised; executive and judicial departments should be separated absolutely; salaries where
grossly inadequate should be raised; objectionable nominees should
be strongly opposed by the bar, etc. The appendix, with its synopsis,
forms a very valuable addition to the paper.
Sovereignty and the Modern State. Noble C. Butler. The slow
passing of the idea of sovereignty, which, from its authoritative statement and the mechanical perfection of the form of that statement, has
so long enthralled the mind of the American and English lawyer, is
signalled by the articles of this class which appear every now and
then in the legal periodicals. They are usually very good anI very
bright articles and this paper is no exception to the rule, if it is not
even better tian the most of them. The shadow of Hobbes and
Bentham and Austin is passing, although it may well be that the
average lawyer is as unconscious of the greater brilliancy of the legal
atmosphere in which he dwells now as he was of the shadow under
which the master minds of his profession chose to keep his chosen
field. James Wilson was probably the first American to expose the
fallacy of the definition of sovereignty as it was held in ,,
and as it has ever since been defined. Those who are endeavoring to
define it at this time might find his exvosition profitable reading.

THE COLUMBIA LAw

REvEw.-May.

Do We Need a Philosophy of Law? Roscoe Pound. After noting
that the common law wherever and whenever it has comorii'conflict
with other legal systems has absorbed and assimilated those other
systems out of existence or absolutely displaced them, we find the
reaso;, for this fact stated to be that hitherto the peoples have "been
with it." But now upon examination of the digests we find decision
after decision which runs directly contrary to the trend of the times,
the thought of the people. Certain legislation has been decided upon
by the people, and after careful formulation has been given to the
legislatures, which in conformity to their will have enacted the requisite laws. To these laws the coufts have refused to give effect; it
may be in strict conformity to the legal development of the law as it
has come down to them, as Mr. Pound says, but, also as he says, not
in conformity with that reason which is the life of the law. The
people understand that the courts are established to administer the
law, and when they find that the courts refuse to give effect to law
after law which they have made, and which they have decided to be
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necessary to their well-being, that action arouses a deep-seated and bitter resentment. This feeling of the people towards the common law
is felt by Mr. Pound to be the greatest danger that that law has to
face. Most unexpectedly he turns to the law schools as the possible
savers of the situation. They are to teach the new philosophy of the
law, one better suited to the times and the temper of the people than
the smooth syllables of Blackstone or the rougher utterances of Coke.
The law schools may do well to note the new burden laid upon them
and their responsibility for the future well-being of the common law.
Agcncy by Estoppel. John S. Ewart. Mr. Ewart here replies to Professor Cook, whose interesting article on " Age-cy by Estoppel" has
attracted the attention of those holding a different point of view. His
opponent is also able and interesting, and his argument is logical and
consistent, but in naming himself an 'estoppel sinner' and in his
answer as a whole he has shown rather the eagerness of the man with
a thesis to sustain than the calmness of one who desires a dispassionate examination of the matter under discussion. To one not conz
cerned it would seem that those in controversy will first need to agree
as to the real point at issue if further discussion is to be of value.
Money Paid Under Mistake of Law. Frederic C. Woodward. The
"rule that money paid under a mistake of law is not recoverable" is
attacked on the ground that "the reasons for the rule are unsound."
We are then shown what encroachments upon the rule have been made,
-these being largely in the Southern and Western States,--and an
examination is made as to the principle that ought to be applied. Mr.
Woodward concludes by urging upon the courts and legislatures "That
without abrogating the present rule denying the recovery of money
paid under mistake of law, but by confining its application to cases in
which the money appears to have been paid with the consciousness
of a doubt as to the law, the hardship of the rule will be minimized
if not entirely eliminated, and the whole law of relief from mistake
placed upon a basis of sound and consistent policy."
THE GaREN BAG.-May.
The Law's Delays. Can They be Obviated? This issue of the
Green Bag is entirely devoted to a consideration of this subject. William Lambert Barnard gives " A Summary of Conditions in the
United States;" James M. Gwin, "Delay in Civil Procedure in Chicago;" B. Newton Crane, "The Modern English Procedure;" and
some fifteen most able men combine to write upon " The Applicability
of English Methods to Conditions in the United States." They generally seem to concede that, from Mr. Crane's statement of the case,
the English methods would be a great improvement if applied in this
country. The great difficulty is that Mr. Crane's view of the case
may not be absolutely flawless. The value of this concensus of opinion would be greatly enhanced if it could be perceived that the gentlemen had studied the English methods for themselves. This does
not seem to have been the case with the possible exception of Mr.
Westernhaver, of Ohio, and Mr. Elder, of Massachusetts. Some of
Mr. Westernhaver's suggestions seem to be most applicable and to be
especially the outcome of his own study of the situation. Mr. B. H.
Conner gives a paper on " Celerity in Commercial Cases in France,"
which incidentally gives a view of one of the most interesting courts
in that country. Mr. Henry Burnham Brooks writes on the situation
in Italy." It need not be said that when the Green Bag devotes so
much space to investigating such a subject there will be found in the
matter given very much that is valuable, interesting, and of more than
ephemeral importance.

